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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the choice between two instruments of
environmental policy (pollution taxes vs emission permits) affects the market shares in the
presence of imperfectly competitive product markets. We consider two countries, referred to
as the Domestic country and the Foreign country, agreeing on an equally stringent exogenous
ceiling on pollution. These countries are also suppliers on the international markets of two
commodities produced by two separate sectors competing à￿la￿Cournot. The environmental
policy taken by each government is different. The Domestic country implements a tradable
emission permits market, while the Foreign country imposes a specific pollution tax across
sectors. Thus, the Higher￿Abatement￿Cost (the Lower) sector in the Domestic country
increases (decreases) its market shares compared to its counterpart in the Foreign country.
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The development of environmental regulation is regarded as an important policy con-
c e r ni nd i ﬀerent countries. At the international level environmental policies, which
might be implemented, may be diﬀerent from one country to another. They might
diverge owing to each country’s collective choices and their speciﬁc characteristics.
Then, it won’t be surprising if the environmental regulatory regimes implemented
in each country would be diﬀerent in their design and rules. Hence, Dijkstra [1999]
demonstrates that decisions in environmental policy are based on public-choice con-
siderations and are heavily inﬂuenced by the pleadings of special-interest groups,
which result to the diﬀerent environmental regulations applied.
This paper is concerned with the choice of two instruments to implement an
emission constraint: pollution taxes or a tradable emission permits (TEP) system.
The relationship between industry oligopoly and environmental regulation has been
widely analyzed. Simpson [1995] and Carraro et al. [1996] consider pollution taxes
incidences within Cournot oligopoly on output and proﬁtability. In an international
framework, Barrett [1994] developed a partial equilibrium model of environmen-
tal regulation standards as a strategic industrial policy - dealing with the concept
of "ecological dumping". In a partial framework Malueg [1990] and Sartzetakis
[1997] also investigate the interaction between the market for emission permits with
an oligopolistic product market and the comparison with a command-and-control
(CAC) approach. In the past, command and control measures were mainly used
to regulate pollution but more recently ecological taxes and emission permits have
been implemented. The public choice approach address the motivations of this
wider acceptance for the use of market-based instruments in environmental policy.
Used as policy instruments for regulating emissions, environmental market-based
instruments (discriminated pollution taxes or emission trading) have attracted in-
deed much attention in many countries in order to introduce more ﬂexibility on
pollution control. Actually, pollution taxes are implemented in a diﬀerentiated way
between sectors for strategic exemption considerations. On the other hand, a trad-
able permits market represents a system of property rights for the management of
environmental pollution. Beyond determining the optimal level of emission permits,
policy makers face the diﬃculty to ﬁnd an eﬃcient mechanism of allocating the
permits. Indeed, the initial allowance of permits issued may lead to competitive
distortions between ﬁrms on the international market product. As noted by Van
der Laan and Nentjes [2001], there are two interpretations of competitive market
distortion concept: as an ineﬃciency in allocation of resources and as an inequity
of ﬁrms starting conditions. A government might allocate emission permits to its
domestic industries, whilst the other would impose pollution taxes to its industries,
operating in the same international product market. This is the reason why we
can wonder as Woerdman [2001] if grandfathering distribution of permits could be
interpreted as a form of implicit subsidization according to the WTO rules or as a
form of "State Aid"1 under the European law.
1The notion of State Aid is formulated in the Article 87(1) in the Treated of Amsterdam as "...
1This paper intends to analyze the strategic trade implications of alternative
choices for environmental instruments (pollution taxes vs emission permits). Over
last decade, pollution taxes have indeed often be implemented in a diﬀerentiated
way (OECD [1994], [1999]) between industries due to distributional concerns, leack-
age incentives or strategic trade considerations. This idea has been analyzed in Hoel
[1996]. He investigates the optimal tax diﬀerentiation across industries. Nannerup
[2001] considers also environmental tax diﬀerentiation as a strategic environmen-
tal policy to extract foreign rents in an international product market. Sartzetakis
and Constantatos [1995] examine how country’s choice of environmental regulation
(command-and-control or permits) aﬀects trade patterns. This paper diﬀers from
these previous studies as it compares in an international framework the implications
of diﬀerentiated taxes vs emission permits.
Our result are similar to Sartzetakis and Constantatos [1995] with a diﬀerenti-
ated tax instead of using a CAC regulation. The shift of product market shares
operates also when a country uses a price incentive for emission control (represented
by pollution taxes) compared with a direct regulation (CAC). However market-
based instruments for pollution control is actually more commonly used and this
paper reﬂects the public choice preferences. Pollution taxes introduce also more
ﬂexibility for a lower abatement cost industry to increase its market share than in a
CAC approach. Our work suggests that a high abatement cost industry (regulated
through a tradable permits system) can increase its market shares compared to its
rivals (regulated through pollution tax e ss y s t e m ) . T h er e v e r s ea p p l i e sf o ral o w
abatement cost industry. It follows that a permits system is not always beneﬁcial
for each industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework of the
analysis and presents the trade equilibrium model without any environmental reg-
ulations. We focus on the Cournot-Nash industry equilibrium on the international
markets with pollution regulated in a Domestic country with diﬀerentiated pollution
taxes and a tradable emission permits scheme in the Foreign country. Then, section
3 considers the incidences of the diﬀerent environmental regulation mechanisms on
market shares and proﬁts. Section 4 oﬀers conclusion.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider two countries, indexed by i = d,f, referred to as the Domestic country and
the Foreign country respectively. Each country is constituted by two oligopoly in-
dustry sectors, indexed by j =1 ,2, which are the sole suppliers on the international
market of diﬀerent commodities. Each industry is consisting of a single representa-
tive ﬁrm. Denote by qij the output level of ﬁrm j located in country i.I ti sf u r t h e r
assumed that all production is sold for export in a third country, in which inverse
any State Aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsover which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain good shall, in so far as it aﬀects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the
common market".
2demand is assumed linear of the form: Pj = Aj − qdj − qfj. The competition on
t h es i d eo fe a c he x p o r t i n gﬁrms is à-la Cournot-Nash. Firm ij faces a total cost of
production Cij(qij)=cjqij,w h e r ecj is a technological parameter representing the
constant marginal cost of production in industry j equal across oligopolists in the
same sector and located diﬀerent countries.
2.1 Trade equilibrium without environmental regulations
Consider, as the benchmark case, a situation in which governments don’t impose
any constraints on the aggregate level of emissions. Thus, each representative ﬁrm
j l o c a t e di nc o u n t r yi is maximizing its proﬁts, taking as given the decision of its
rival in the other country: Max
qij
Πij =( Pj − cj)qij =( Aj − qdj − qfj)qdj − cjqij for
i = d,f and j =1 ,2.
In the trade equilibrium without any environmental regulations, the Cournot-
Nash level of output, the level of price and the proﬁte a r n e db ye a c hﬁrm in the










where the uperscript (∗) denotes the variables values in the benchmark case.
2.2 Trade equilibrium with environmental regulations
Let’s now turn to the trade equilibrium with environmental regulation. We address
here the issue of the regulatory intervention regime to highlight the incidences of
introducing diﬀerent environmental feedbacks in the previous model.
Suppose production for both industries is resulting in emissions of a common
pollutant, which generates a negative externality. The emissions in each industry
increase with the level of output and are taken to be inversely proportional to the
level of abatement eﬀorts. Our speciﬁcation for the polluting emissions and the
abatement activities are based on Kennedy [1994] and Nannerup [2001]. Let eij =
qij
aij
denotes the amount of pollutant emitted by industry j located in country i,w i t haij
representing the chosen level of abatement eﬀort interpreted as the chosen output-
emission ratio in industry j. The emission reduction imposes a cost to undertake
emission abatement activities. Firm j’s total cost of abatement in country i, denoted
by Kij(qij,a ij)=γ2
jaijqij, is supposed to be a non-decreasing function in both of its
arguments. The technological parameter γj is diﬀerent across industry and captures
the eﬃciency in controlling emissions. It denotes the change in industry j0 sm a r g i n a l
cost of abatement. Hence, each sector is characterized by a heterogenous cost of
abatement proﬁle within the same country and a symmetric abatement cost structure
across countries. For simplicity, we assume that industry 1 refers to the Lower-
Abatement-Cost (LAC) sector and industry 2 to the Higher-Abatement-Cost (HAC)
3sector, in the sense that γ1 <γ 2 for a given level of output. Therefore industry 1,
having substantially a more eﬃcient technology in abatement activities, faces a lower
expenditures in reducing emission discharges.
An international environmental agreement imposes a similar target level on pol-
lution ¯ E = ¯ Ed = ¯ Ef to these countries. However the measures taken by each
country, through which this level is achieved, are diﬀerent. The Domestic country
implements an economic incentive mechanism through a grandfathering tradable
emission permits system, whereas the Foreign country imposes a speciﬁc-industry
pollution tax across ﬁrms in a form of a diﬀerentiated emission tax per unit of waste
discharged in the global environment. In this framework consider now the interna-
tional trade equilibrium to focus on output redistribution eﬀects and on distortion
of competition between countries.
2.2.1 The Domestic country: the tradable emission permits case
The Domestic regulator aims at reducing its emissions to the target ¯ E deﬁned in
the international environmental agreement and implements a tradable emission per-
mits (TEP) market. This latter approach requires all polluting industries to obtain
emission permits for their quantity of pollutant released. Emission permits are dis-
tributed free of charge to the two domestic industries by initiating a grandfathering
system, which allocates permits on the basis of their historic pre-regulation level of
emissions.
Industry j receives an initial allocation of permits denoted by ¯ edj for j =1 ,2.
The total endowment of permits is equal to the aggregate emissions ceiling set by the
domestic regulator, deﬁned as ed1 +ed2 = ¯ E. After the initial distribution, industry
j’s net demand for permits is determined by NEdj = edj − ¯ edj.T h e n , t r a d e o f
permits is authorized. Now ﬁrm j, choosing its level of output and abatement eﬀort,
maximizes its proﬁts taking the permits price p
pen
d as given according to:
Max
qdj ,a dj
Πdj = Pjqdj − Kdj(qdj,a dj) − cjqdj − p
pen
d (edj − ¯ edj) (2)
The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions for the proﬁt-maximizing choice
of production qdj and of abatement eﬀorts adj imply:
∂Πdj
∂qdj



















In equation (3), the initial endowment of permits doesn’t aﬀect sector j’s mar-
ginal decision since the permits price is considered as given. As pointed out in the
latter condition of equation (4), industry j trades permits until its marginal cost of
abatement is equal to the opportunity cost of holding an additional permits, rep-
resented by the permits price p
pen
d . This price reﬂects indeed the global emission
4target. Thus, this optimality rule leads to the fact that the permits price provides
the correct incentive for industries to arrange their emission levels. From equation







for j =1 ,2 (5)
Under a tradable permits market these conditions imply that, in equilibrium,
the two industries’ marginal costs of abatement are equal to the permits price. As
γ1 <γ 2, then ¯ ad2 < ¯ ad1. The LAC sector (whose marginal cost of abatement is
lower) undertakes more emission reductions and sells its permits to the HAC sector
2. Moreover, equalization of marginal abatement costs yields an eﬃcient distribution
of abatement eﬀorts across industries in the Domestic country.
We obtain industry j’s best reaction function by rearranging conditions (3) and
(4). This reaction function is derived for a given permits price. If the domestic








d − cj − qfj] for j =1 ,2 (6)
The above remarks demonstrates that both market demand and cost function
are modiﬁed by the introduction of a tradable emission permits regulation.
2.2.2 The Foreign country: the pollution taxes case
The Foreign regulator imposes a diﬀerentiated speciﬁc-industry tax rate per unit of
waste released regarding its emissions target ¯ E.L e ttfj denote the speciﬁcp o l l u t i o n
tax for industry j. This assumption of diﬀerentiating tax duties among the two
foreign industries reﬂects the consideration of realistic environmental policy on tax
exemption requirement (OECD [1994,1999]) or the incentive to adopt strategic en-
vironmental policy for controlling pollution (Nannerup [2001]). As industry 1 -t h e
LAC sector - is assumed to be more eﬃcient than industry 2 - the HAC sector - in
controlling emissions (ie. γ1 <γ 2) the foreign regulator decides to levy a lower tax
for this former industry. Then, tf1 <t f2. Confronted with tfj, each ﬁrm j chooses
its level of output and abatement eﬀorts by maximizing its proﬁt:
Max
qij,a ij
Πfj = Pjqfij − cjqfj − Kfj(qfj,a fj) − tfjefj for j =1 ,2 (7)
The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for Cournot-Nash equilibrium choice of out-
put and abatement can be written as:
∂Πfj
∂qfj















5From equation (9), we obtain the level of pollution abatement in the Cournot-





for j =1 ,2 (10)







tfj − cj − qdj] for j =1 ,2 (11)
The foreign reaction function for industry j is decreasing with the foreign envi-
ronmental speciﬁct a xr a t e .
2.2.3 Trade equilibrium
Under a Cournot-Nash competition in each international products market j =1 ,2,





































where the uperscipt (−) denotes the variables’ values at the trade equilibrium
with environmental regulations. Comparison of equations (1) and (12)-(14) re-
veals how environmental regulations aﬀect industry j’s output compared to its pre-
regulation level.









γ1(A1 − c1)+γ2(A2 − c2)+2 tf1γ2
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The equilibrium permits price depends on the aggregate emission standard level
¯ E and remains independent from the initial distribution between industries. This
is not surprising since each industry is price taker in the permits market and their
permits endowments are exogenous. The equilibrium permits price also increases
with the value of the diﬀerentiated taxes in the Foreign country.
In the Domestic country, both industries have an incentive to trade their permits
at a price p
tep
d . In fact, trading of emission permits in the Domestic country implies
a redistribution of abatement activities from the less eﬃcient sector - the HAC
industry - to the more eﬃcient sector - the LAC industry. This latter industry
6increases its abatement per unit of output and, thus, its marginal cost of abatement.
The domestic industries trade permits until equalization of their marginal cost of
abatement. Since the domestic HAC sector (regulated through a TEP system) is
less eﬃcient in controlling its emission, it faces a lower implicit price for pollution
p
tep
d than with a regulation through pollution taxes, such that p
tep
d <t f2. The same
relation applies to the LAC sector. Hence, it follows that the permit price is between
the higher and the lower pollution tax, such that tf1 <p
tep
d <t f2. This redistribution
of emission control eﬀorts among the domestic industries has two eﬀects. First, the
aggregate cost of abatement for a given level of output decreases. Second, market
shares are redistributed between ﬁrms in the international products market.
3 Interpretation and comments
At this stage, let’s have a closer look at the market shares shifting eﬀect. The
incidence of diﬀerences in environmental regulatory regimes on the trade equilibrium
is illustrated as follows. Since environmental regulations increase marginal cost of
each industry, ﬁrm’s reaction function are shifting downwards. However, the eﬀect
of environmental regulations on market shares are diﬀerent in each industries.
Proposition 1 The domestic HAC (the LAC) sector, regulated through a tradable
emission approach, in the Domestic country increases (decreases) its market shares
compared to its foreign counterpart.
As tf1 <p
tep
d <t f2, marginal cost of the domestic LAC industry increases more
than its foreign rival. Then the LAC industry’s reaction function shifts more inwards
than its foreign competitor, while the reverse applies in the HAC industry. The
level of output in the domestic LAC industry decreases while the domestic HAC
industry increases its level of output compared to the pre-regulation equilibrium.
Compared to Sartzetakis and Constantatos[1995], this result shows that a tradable
permit system does not systematically shift international trade patterns in favor of
the domestic industry.
It appears also that domestic industries, regulated by a grandfathering permits
system, don’t need to acquire their emission level up to their initial permits endow-
ment contrary to the foreign industry regulated by a speciﬁc pollution tax. Since
the grandfathered industry obtains a windfall proﬁt in the form of a capital gift, the
domestic permits system implies a competitive distortion. Thus, the domestic indus-
try has more ﬁnancial resources than its foreign competitor. It can be argued that
the international diﬀerences in environmental regulations change industry’s starting
condition, inducing thus an inequitable distortion in trade patterns.
From equation (2) and (12)-(14), the proﬁts earned by each industry j =1 ,2 in




























d ¯ edj (17)
Proposition 2 Grandfathering permits can be regarded as "State Aid”, in the sense
that it grants a lump-sum subsidy to the domestic industries since the initial alloca-
tion implies for them a ﬁnancial advantage.
Nevertheless, a grandfathering emission permits system may not alter trade ef-
ﬁciency, since grandfathering permits generate an opportunity cost equal to the
permits price. Indeed, grandfathering permits are used for covering the emissions of
the permits owners. Instead of using them, the domestic industry could have sold
them. From this perspective, grandfathering permits does not distort eﬃciency as
i t so p p o r t u n i t yc o s t si sa l s or e ﬂected in the product price.
These interpretations are only valid when the Foreign country implements dis-
criminated pollution taxes across industries for exemption concerns. In the case of a
uniform pollution tax, market shares among countries wouldn’t have been modiﬁed
since the foreign permits price would be equal to the pollution tax rate. Then, de-
viating from a uniform environmental tax and implementing diﬀerent market-based
instruments to control pollution have distributional implications in the international
products market.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that if the environmental regulators in the Domestic and
the Foreign country adopt diﬀerent regulatory regimes to control emissions, then
competition in the international products market is distorted. This argument can
support a claim that governments may engage in environmental policy coordination
to prevent from altering global international trade conditions.
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